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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 16/05/2006 Accident number: 147 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 29/09/1997 
Where it occurred: Kushk district, Herat 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  




Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
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Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for six years. The victim had attended a revision course four 
months before and last been on leave 42 days before the accident. The ground where he was 
working was described as "agricultural land alongside a ditch: soft ground". The demining 
group claim to have found fragments of the mine from which they identified it as a PMN.  
The investigators determined that the accident occurred when the deminer used only one 
marking stone to mark a detector signal, then prodded in a squatting position which "failed 
him to maintain the correct prodding angle". It is suggested that he was careless because he 
thought he had detected a fragment (having detected many fragments immediately 
beforehand). 
The Sub-Commander said that the victim was injured because he was not working properly. 
The Section Leader said the deminer ignored his partner's correction and prodded without 
wearing his helmet, believing the signal was from a fragment. 
The victim stated that he did not put his helmet on because "it was very streaky and shaking 
of bush." [He may have meant that the visor was hard to see through.] He blamed his 
supervisor who had pushed him to work quickly and instructed him to adjust the sensitivity of 
his detector to zero, so leading him to get a confusing signal. 
The victim's partner said he made the mistake of believing the signal was from a fragment. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim did not follow the marking procedure properly, did 
not wear his helmet and visor while prodding. They also said that the ground was suitable for 
prodding in a prone position, but the victim was squatting. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that marking procedure must be followed properly and all 
readings must be treated as a mine. They also said that the team command group must 
stress the need to wear helmets when prodding and that disciplinary action should be taken 
against the Section Leader for poor command and control. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 188 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as loss of both eyes, serious facial injuries and injuries 
to his right shoulder and left hand. 
The demining group reported that the victim had lost both eyes, suffered severe facial injury 
and injured his left arm.  
A disability claim was forwarded to his insurers on December 9th saying that the victim had 
been left permanently disabled. His left eye had been "destroyed". His right eye was severely 
damaged and needed further surgery: its vision was "low". He also had severe facial injuries, 
chest, left arm and right hand multiple superficial wounds and a deep injury to his forehead. A 
photograph showed bandaged eyes and a chest wound. 
A compensation cheque for 500,000 Rs was issued on 31st December 1997 and paid on 5th 
March 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly and his errors were not corrected. If he had been told to adjust his 
detector to reduce false alarms, this represents a gross field control inadequacy. If the visor 
he was given to wear was impossible to see though, the management's failure to provide 
useable equipment would be a serious management failing.  
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements.  The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing. 
The persistent delays within the UN MAC between the date of compensation cheques being 
issued and them being paid may deserve investigation.    
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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